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NEW LOAN PROVISIONING STANDARDS AND PROCYCLICALITY
The adoption of the new expected credit loss provisioning standard – IFRS 9 – is a 
landmark. What are its implications for financial stability? While the new standard is likely 
to mitigate the procyclicality of the financial system to some extent relative to the previous, 
incurred loss model, it falls short by a significant margin of what one would like from a 
financial stability perspective. This points to broader inevitable tensions between 
accounting and prudential regulation, and calls for the active use of backstops (or so-
called prudential filters) to preserve stability. Experience with the operation of the alternative 
dynamic (countercyclical) credit loss provisioning scheme adopted by the Banco de 
España points to some strengths and weaknesses in the broader macroprudential 
frameworks in which such arrangements are embedded.
The adoption of the new expected credit loss (ECL) provisioning standard – IFRS 9 – is a 
landmark. It represents the end-point of a long – in some respects extraordinary – journey 
that started around 2000, with the emergence of more systematic concerns about the 
“procyclicality” of the financial system. It was these concerns that prompted the development 
of the conceptual underpinnings of macroprudential frameworks and the subsequent 
implementation of those frameworks post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC). To be sure, the 
adoption of the new accounting standard was not intended to address procyclicality per se; 
rather, it aimed to align the approach with the more forward-looking nature of fair value 
accounting generally. Even so, the change did follow an explicit request by the G20 and the 
Financial Stability Board in the context of how to deal with procyclicality.
The Banco de España has been a pioneer in this area, with its early adoption in 2000 of 
countercyclical (or dynamic) provisions [Saurina and Trucharte (2017)].
In what follows, I would like to broaden the focus a bit and address three questions. First, 
how far do the new provisioning standards address the procyclicality in credit loss 
provisioning? Second, what does this tell us about the tensions between accounting and 
prudential regulation and about potential remedies? And finally, have macroprudential 
frameworks fulfilled the expectations of their advocates, of whom I have been one [Borio 
(2003)]?
Let me anticipate the three answers. First, the new standards are likely to mitigate 
procyclicality to some extent relative to the previous, incurred loss model, but from a 
financial stability perspective they fall short by a significant margin of what one would like 
to see. Second, the tensions between accounting and prudential regulation are inevitable, 
calling for the active use of backstops (or so-called prudential filters). Finally, we need to 
be realistic about what macroprudential frameworks can do on their own: they are more 
effective in strengthening the financial system’s resilience than in taming procyclicality – or 
the financial cycle.
Let me take each point in turn.
To understand how far the new ECL provisioning standard addresses procyclicality, it is 
useful to say a few words about the nature of the problem and how the Banco de España’s 
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Procyclicality denotes the financial system’s tendency to generate financial booms 
and busts and, more specifically, those mechanisms that feed onto themselves to 
amplify financial fluctuations [Borio et al. (2001)]. At the core of those mechanisms is 
the self-reinforcing interaction between funding constraints, asset prices and risk-
taking. For instance, during expansions funding constraints become looser, asset 
prices soar, risk-taking increases, triggering a vicious circle until the process becomes 
unsustainable and, at some point, that risk-taking reverses. As a result, booms 
generate busts.
Procyclicality arises for two reasons. One is that incentives to take on risk are 
procyclical. Think, for instance, of herding, just to mention one. The other is that, 
above all, measures of risk are procyclical, because the inputs are. During booms, 
asset prices soar, inflating collateral values, credit spreads narrow, volatility declines (it 
is inversely related to asset prices), correlations decline, reducing the volatility of 
portfolio returns and profits and free cash flows increase. During busts, these 
relationships reverse.
Put differently, procyclicality fundamentally changes the conception of risk [Crockett 
(2001)]. Risk is not low in booms and high in busts – the previous conception; but it builds 
up in booms and materialises in busts. The bust is a consequence of the boom that 
precedes it.
Of course, some procyclicality is inevitable and inherent in economic activity. But, unless 
restrained, procyclicality can give rise to outsize financial fluctuations, or financial cycles, 
that are typically at the heart of financial instability.
The previous incurred loss model of credit provisioning – IAS 39 – was clearly 
procyclical  [Borio and Lowe (2001)]. In general, provisions could be made only when 
a loss impairment event or events had taken place. In the former terminology, they 
could be taken only when risk materialised. As a result, losses over the life of the credit 
exposure were underestimated during the boom. The scheme did not recognise those 
embedded in the portfolio.
The Banco de España’s dynamic provisioning scheme tackled this problem head-on 
[Saurina and Trucharte (2017)]. To simplify: at inception, the provisions on a loan would be 
equal to the average loss made on similar loans during previous recessions. Those 
provisions would be released automatically as losses materialised.
One could, of course, take issue with some aspects of the scheme. For instance, it 
did not account explicitly for loan pricing, which should already incorporate an 
expected-loss element [Borio and Lowe (2001)]. And there was some inevitable 
arbitrariness in the selection of benchmarks for the size of the provisions. In fact, the 
chosen recession year – 1993 – turned out to underestimate by a very large margin 
the losses during the GFC. But the scheme had the great merit of being truly 
countercyclical, of being simple and, in particular, of having an automatic release 
mechanism. The importance of this last feature should not be underestimated. One 
should recall that it has proved exceedingly difficult to design a similar automatic 
release trigger for the countercyclical capital buffer. I was intimately involved in the 
process and, believe me, we did try! In the end, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision could only produce general guidelines. This left plenty of room for 
discretion, making life harder for supervisors.
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Against this benchmark, the new ECL forward-looking scheme falls short by a 
significant margin. Granted, the scheme correctly seeks to identify the losses 
embedded in the portfolio in good times: this is an important step forward. But its 
impact on procyclicality is much weaker. For one, the scheme leaves ample room for 
firms’ discretion. They will still have a strong incentive to underprovision, especially in 
good times, and it will not be easy for auditors to correct this – just as it has not been 
easy for prudential authorities to address the biases embedded in banks’ internal risk 
models. In addition, and above all, the scheme remains point-in-time. That is, it does 
not have the in-built look-back, mean-reverting element at the core of the Banco de 
España’s dynamic provisioning scheme. Firms are simply asked to forecast losses 
over a particular horizon given available information, without the restriction of using 
the average or stress loss incurred over past cycles. As a result, provisions are still 
subject to the typically strong procyclicality of risk assessments.
Thus, compared with the incurred loss standard, the most we can expect from the new one 
is that it will bring forward some of the provisioning. Work done at the BIS, published in our 
Quarterly Review, confirms this intuition [Cohen and Edwards (2017)]. Better loss recognition 
in good times is very welcome. And if the scheme is properly implemented, recognition of 
higher losses in good times means recognition of smaller losses in bad times, ie less 
procyclicality. The extent, though, is to be seen and deserves close study. It will clearly 
depend, among other things, on the implementation details, not least the models used to 
forecast losses.
This naturally takes me to my second point – the uneasy relationship between accounting, 
on the one hand, and prudential regulation, on the other. We can call them two 
“uncomfortable bedfellows” [Borio and Tsatsaronis (2004)]. And in fact, the same is true of 
the relationship between accounting and sound risk management [Borio and Tsatsaronis 
(2006)].
The tensions between accounting and prudential regulation started to become 
irreconcilable once accounting shifted away from the “prudence” principle in order to 
provide a “true and fair” picture of a firm’s condition. We could have a long discussion 
about what “true and fair” really means and about how far the principles really do that. 
Think, for instance, of the well known debate around “income smoothing” in the context 
of dynamic provisions [Borio and Lowe (2001)]. But there is little doubt that accounting 
standards are not always consistent with the requirements of financial stability. The 
incurred loss model example, and the acute procyclicality induced by fair value 
accounting more generally, are testimony to this.
A similar tension arises between accounting and sound risk management. Let me just 
quote from a famous firm’s internal risk management manual:
“Reported earnings follow the rules and principles of accounting. The results do 
not always create measures consistent with underlying economics. However, 
corporate management’s performance is generally measured by accounting 
income, not underlying economics. Risk management strategies are therefore 
directed at accounting rather than economic performance.”
This quotation happens to be from Enron’s operating manual – and we all know what 
happened to that firm! But I suspect it could equally come from that of any other firm. 
Whether we like it or not, accounting drives incentives and hence behaviour – in fact, it 
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is designed to do precisely that. A kind of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is at work 
here: how we measure valuations ends up influencing valuations, as agents respond to 
them – again, think of procyclicality. It is here that micro meets macro: what firms take 
as given in the small, such as market prices, is influenced by their collective behaviour. 
Measurement cannot be neutral: it affects what is being measured [Borio and Tsatsaronis 
(2006)]. Accounting doesn’t just record facts, it alters those facts.
How can the tension between accounting and prudential regulation best be managed? I 
think it would be unrealistic to have accounting standard setters take financial stability into 
account: that is not their objective. Nor do I think they could be persuaded to re-adopt the 
principle of prudence. Except where bank supervisors have authority over accounting 
standards for banks and are prepared to override accounting standard setters, this is not 
a feasible option. That, of course, is what the Banco de España did with its dynamic 
provisions. And it is what a number of prudential authorities in Asia and Latin America are 
still doing [Restoy and Zamil (2017)]. The cost of doing so, however, is to clash head-on 
with the accounting profession, as it would get in the way of what they want and what they 
are mandated to achieve.
Short of that, prudential authorities have three options. 
One is to argue with accounting standard setters on their own terms. Forward-looking 
provisioning principles are one such example. But, as noted, they do not go far enough 
from a financial stability perspective.
A second option is to persuade accounting authorities to require that firms disclose 
more risk information, notably information about the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding valuations. I argued for this many years ago [Borio and Tsatsaronis 
(2004, 2006)], and I am glad to see that standards have moved in that direction, in 
particular IFRS 7. But again, this is not enough for financial stability: the investors 
and depositors that should enforce market discipline are subject to the same 
measurement and incentive problems of the institutions they are supposed to 
restrain.
A third option is to adopt prudential backstops or filters to offset accounting valuations – a 
practice that has been in place for some time now. These measures can compensate for 
some of the shortcomings of accounting provisions by adjusting regulatory capital, 
possibly complemented with restrictions on dividend payments. To my mind, these filters 
are indeed indispensable. 
The real issue is how to calibrate and structure them. There is a wide range of possibilities, 
from simply deriving adjustments based on information that contains a mean-reverting 
element, such as financial cycle indicators, to adopting the same type of adjustment 
embedded in the Banco de España’s dynamic provisions – in effect, a simple through-the-
cycle filter. With colleagues, we plan to look into this issue in more depth. 
The advantage of such prudential filters is that they decouple accounting from regulatory 
valuations, allowing each authority to pursue its preferred objective [Borio and Tsatsaronis 
(2004)]. This advantage should not be underestimated. The disadvantage is the other side 
of the coin, ie the filters are less effective in enforcing market discipline on banks than 
changing accounting standards themselves. This is because they do not affect the bottom 
line earnings figures analysts and markets focus on.
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Finally, some reflections on macroprudential frameworks, of which backstops for ECLs are 
just one element.
As an early strong advocate of such frameworks, I was very happy when they were adopted 
following the GFC. This has represented real progress. 
But now the pendulum may have swung too far. There is a widespread belief that 
macroprudential frameworks are the solution to procyclicality. My personal assessment 
is that they are part of the solution, but not the whole solution. They unquestionably 
strengthen the financial system’s resilience, as they reinforce its defences to face 
financial cycle busts. But they are less effective in restraining financial booms in the 
first place. 
There is considerable evidence to that effect. In particular, the active deployment of 
macroprudential tools in some countries, mainly emerging market economies, has not 
prevented the emergence of the familiar signs of the build-up of dangerous financial 
imbalances – typically, cumulative credit growth and asset price increases, notably 
property prices, in excess of historical benchmarks. These elements are the basis of the 
early warning indicators that worked pretty well pre-GFC [Borio and Drehmann (2009)]. 
The Spanish experience with dynamic provisions confirms this assessment: according to 
the Banco de España’s own analysis, dynamic provisions have not succeeded in restraining 
credit growth significantly [Saurina and Trucharte (2017)]. Admittedly, other measures, 
such as maximum loan-to-value ratios and debt service-to-income ratios, have a larger 
impact. But this does not alter the overall conclusion.
In my view, tackling the financial cycle requires a more holistic policy framework, which in 
addition to sound prudential standards also involves monetary and fiscal policy, and even 
structural policies. This is what we at the BIS call a “macro-financial stability framework”. 
We discussed these issues at some length in the latest BIS Annual Economic Report [Bank 
for International Settlements (2018)], and I examined them further in my remarks at our last 
Annual General Meeting [Borio (2018)].
In other words, there is a material risk that unrealistic expectations of what macroprudential 
frameworks can deliver on their own stands in the way of desirable adjustments in 
monetary and fiscal policies. I think we have seen signs of this danger materialising.
Of course, my assessment could be overly pessimistic. Only time will tell. Let’s hope it will 
not take another crisis to find out.
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